The Kerala COVID-19 Template: How to Lead in the Fight against a Pandemic

Comparative politics, Natural Environment, Politics, Public health,

When the coronavirus pandemic eventually reached India, it was always going to pose a challenge of epic proportions for a country of 1.3+ billion people, with such a dense population domiciled  in such close quarters, and with a widespread underbelly of poverty. The Spanish flu of 1918 inflicted a death toll on India in the many millions, something no doubt in the back of the minds of public health officials. So, two or three months into the crisis, on paper, India’s COVID-19 record, on paper, doesn’t look as frightening as many other nations. As at 17-May-2020, so far it has had a shade under 91 thousand confirmed cases and a total of 2,872 deaths (www.worldometers.info).

10D13447-6663-4F6D-9AD9-DBCF18F47F5E

(Photo: Indranil Mukherjee / Agence France-Presse – Getty Images)

There is a perception within medical circles however that these figures don’t portray the full extent of the outbreak. India’s urban areas are packed with masses of people living face to face, beset with poor sanitation conditions, up to 100 people sharing the same toilet in some cases, adding up to a recipe for catastrophe in plague time. Obtaining a test for coronavirus in India has tended to not be straightforward, thus the level of testing has lagged woefully behind what is desirable, eg, by well into March India was averaging only five tests per ten lakhs (one million) people, compared with South Korea which had managed 4,800 per ten lakhs.

FEA14576-4FB7-40F2-902D-CB14B95FC9CD

Too many migrant workers waiting for too few buses to take them home after the lockdown was announced (Photo: Yawar Nazir – Getty Images)

Containment measures have been far short of perfect, and with some glaring omissions…there has been passive resistance to the lockdowns from sceptical Indians, and the ban on public gatherings has from time to time been skirted round (some ‘scofflaw’ political parties continue to hold mass rallies). Although India’s borders were closed fairly promptly, some have been critical of the procrastination of Indian leaders’ during the crucial early days of the crisis, one Indian epidemiologist characterised it as a “let’s wait till tomorrow” attitude [‘India Scrambles to Escape a Coronavirus Crisis. So Far It’s Working’, (J Gettleman, S Raj, KD Singh & K Schultz), New York Times, 17-March-2020, www.nytimes.com]. This early reticence to act emanated from Delhi. The Modi BJP government, initially seemingly more concerned with the impact on India’s under-performing economy, issued no public health warnings or media briefings at the onset of the pandemic [‘What the world can learn from Kerala about how to fight covid-19’, (Sonia Faleiro), MIT Technology Review, 13-Apr-2020, www.technologyreview.com].

776067EA-29C5-4453-8379-1B7A7AB04BAF

(www.anayahotels.com)

Kerala, leading from the periphery
Kerala is one state that these general criticisms of Indian public health efforts against COVID-19 cannot be levelled. The small southwestern Indian state is one of the most picturesque parts of the land with its coconut trees and irenic and serene back-waterways. Known as a tourist mecca, Kerala, population 35 million, is more affluent than many parts of India (GDP per capital GB£2,200). 20% of India’s gold is consumed here, and it produces over 90% of the country’s rubber. Literacy is nearly 20% higher than the overall Indian average, and life expectancy too, is higher (www.holidify.com). All of these were contributing factors buttressing Kerala’s capacity to cope with the disease when it came.

Local vulnerabilities to the epidemic
Kerala was coronavirus “ground zero” for India’s very first patients. Three students returning from Wuhan were tested positive and hospitalised (in all 70% of the state’s total virus patients have come from outside India). Certain preconditions pertaining to the state exacerbated the risk of disease outbreak, including a large number of Keralite migrant workers in the Gulf states, a huge expat population (working in Kerala from other Indian states), porous borders, and an early summer monsoon season (contributing to Kerala’s high rate of annual communicable diseases) [‘Coronavirus: How India’s Kerala state flattened the curve’, (Soutik Biswas), BBC News, 16-Apr-2020, www.bbcnews.com].

Preparation and planning
Kerala was prepared for COVID-19 before the onset of the disease. The earlier Nipah viral outbreak (NiV) In Kerala (2018) proved a good trial run for the health service, giving the local authorities an opportunity to iron out chinks in it. Kerala’s communist-left coalition  government had established a strong social welfare foundation, investing in the state’s infrastructure with a focus on health and education, and on tackling the state’s poverty. [‘How the Indian State of Kerala flattened the coronavirus curve’, (Oommen C Kurian), Guardian,  21-Apr-2020, www.theguardian.com].

Minister Shailaja (Source: www.manoramonline.com)

B2E20FBF-77CE-4ADA-81DF-901D82E34F63

Shailaja ‘Teacher’, a woman with a plan
When the epidemic arrived in Kerala, the proactive state health minister KK Shailaja took charge. With the full backing of Kerala chief minister, Pinarayi Vijayan, she had already organised a rapid response team to focus on targeted clusters, and liaised with the provincial councils. Kerala adopted the WHO protocols of test, trace, isolate and support. Rigorous contact tracing was employed, utilising detailed “route maps”. Testing of suspected carriers was decisive, with a quick, 48-hour turnaround of the result [‘Kerala has best coronavirus test rate in the country, but is it enough?’, (Vishnu Varna), The Indian Express, 01-Apr-2020, www.indianexpress.com], allowing them to move quickly on to the quarantine phase. 17,000 people were quarantined under strict surveillance, the poor without quarantine facilities were placed in improvised isolation. Recovered patients were duly released back into the community. Quarantine compliance was achieved through an admixture of phone monitoring (>340,000 calls and a neighbourhood watch system [‘The coronavirus slayer! How Kerala’s rock star health minister helped save it from Covid-19’, (Laura Spinney), The Guardian, 14-May-2020, www.theguardian.com; Kurian].

One of the sternest challenges, very early on, came from the district of Pathanamthitta. A family returning from Italy tested positive, but refused to disclose their movements upon return to Kerala. The civil servant in charge of the district, PB Nooh, and his team, worked round this obstacle by accessing the family’s GPS phone data, allowing them to trace all of their contacts (almost 300 people!). Nooh’s staff then tested the contacts for infection, thus shutting down the risk of the virus being exponentially transmitted to others in the community, ie, “breaking the chain” (Faleiro).

The coronavirus certainly didn’t miss Kerala, one-fifth of all Indian cases of the disease have occurred in the state. Under Shailaja, Kerala hit the ground running, before the end of January, screenings of arrivals at all four of the state’s international airports was introduced. The government imposed a lockdown even before the national lockdown was called…schools, malls, cinemas, public gatherings, were closed down, and the lockdown was stricter and longer than the national one (Kurian). Face masks were distributed to slum dwellers. Planning was precise and focused, a state stimulus package of Rs20,000 crore was directed towards the economic and medical crises.The medical task force was mobilised (doctors on leave were recalled, others asked to delay their leave). Those suffering hardship included migrant workers from other states were provided with free lunches by the state.

B04DBE9E-3431-45D1-BEAC-30319F69C38A

Communication with citizens informing them about all aspects of the crisis was clear and consistent (“Break the Chain” campaign which emphasises public and personal hygiene). Accordingly, community participation, both voluntary and active, was forthcoming. Some Keralites made accommodation available (including vacant homes in some instances) to those in need when requested to by the government [‘The Kerala Way of Tackling a Pandemic’, Times of India, 20-Mar-2020, www.timesofindia.com].

The Kerala government’s campaign against the virus has been aided by the polity’s decentralised nature of it’s structures. The coordination achieved allows the local councils to follow through on a lot of the public health measures needed to be implemented in the crisis (Biswas). The result of all this detailed planning and effort by Kerala – 587 confirmed cases and only four deaths and apparently no significant community transmissions (17-Apr-2020).

The state of Kerala and Shailaja ‘Teacher’ (so known because her occupation before entering politics was that of science teacher) are not resting on their laurels, being very mindful of the chance of a second wave of COVID-19 due to impending factors—Prime Minister Modi’s anticipated ending of the national lockdown, which will trigger a mass return of Kerala’s migrant workers based in the Gulf, and the approach of the tropical wet season in Kerala (June) [‘Kerala Lays Down Specific Plans To Tackle Monsoon Amid COVID-19 Pandemic’, NDTV, 15-May-2020, www.ndtv.com]. Minister Shaijala has been making preparations for such an event, many of the state’s teachers have been retrained as nurses to cope with a new upsurge in virus hotspots (Spinney).

2A2FC331-A536-4476-B682-D925116408D1

EndNote: No time for Kerala complacency but a most worthy blueprint on offer 
The threat of new clusters emerging in Kerala remains very real, especially coming from outside, with a spike as recent as this past Friday—imported from neighbouring Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra as well as from overseas—reminding Shailaja and Co that the battle’s still far from won. Nonetheless, for elsewhere in India and beyond, there are lessons from Kerala‘s formidable achievement to be had from the state’s “nimble-footed, community-oriented, cautiously-aggressive approach” to the outbreak [Kurian; ‘Kerala reports 11 new Covid-19 cases’, (Ramesh Babu), Hindustan Times,16-May-2020, www.hindustantimes.com].

₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪

the Kerala government is Marxist in ideology but pragmatic in practice, it’s policies are moderately social-democratic, with a highly-privatised public health system (Kurian)

Two Antithetical Approaches to the COVID-19 Crisis: A Controversial Outlier Versus a Low-key Over-achiever

Comparative politics, Politics, Popular Culture, Public health,, Society & Culture

When a novel virus comes along, such as we are facing now, there is no medical vade mecum, no universal guidebook to follow, no one proven route to safely navigate the crisis. Governments weigh up the choices, then in consultation with medical experts, decide on a strategy and do modelling on how to chart the optimal course through the unpredictable straits of COVID-19. Local factors in each country, the conditions, the capacity to respond, the culture, all shape what direction the fight against the virus takes.

The following focuses on just two of the 212 countries and territories which have reported cases of the novel coronavirus disease. The two countries, Sweden and Vietnam, have very different societies, cultures and political systems. Each has followed its own distinct strategy and have produced results that are polarities apart from each other.
116AE22A-C20A-44B7-8594-033B776F0116

🇸🇪 Sweden
One thing you can’t accuse the home of ABBA and Ingmar Bergman of is sheepishly following the flock. While countries like the US and the UK ‘sleepwalked’ for precious weeks at the start of the crisis, Sweden went out on a limb. From the get-go, Sweden identified itself as an outlier, a contrarian country in the coronavirus war. It adopted a particular course and implemented it. Or to put it another way, Sweden opted for a “change very little”,  “wait and see” position, which amounts in effect to the pursuit of a “herd (or community) immunity” approach. Put simply it means you intentionally expose as many people as possible in the community to infection and so (the theory goes) the majority become immune to the virus. It’s effectiveness hinges on (quickly) minimising the number of high-risk people overall. For it to work, there needs to be an infection rate of at least 60%. Critics of herd immunity, and there are many in both the medical and non-medical world, describe it, among other things, as a “let it rip” strategy.

Getting back to Sweden’s experience, the Social Democrat government under Stefan Lofven, and state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, were at the outset confident of success with a “let it happen ASAP” approach. Sweden stopped organised sporting fixtures and closed university buildings but it eschewed a strategy of mandatory lockdowns (restaurants, bars, cafes and schools for pupils under 16 all stayed open) for a libertarian-like “principle of responsibility”, trusting the Swedish populace to “behave like adults” and do the right thing voluntarily.

56C523A3-9B3F-4502-AB5E-8FD8948B489C

The figures tell a different and disconcerting story: Sweden with a population of just 10.33 million has a reported Covid death toll of 3,225 (as at 10-May-2020) – with capital Stockholm overwhelmingly the primary hotspot. As illustrated below, compared to it’s Nordic neighbours Sweden’s mortality figures resonate like a distress beacon in the ocean, and in per capita terms it even outstrips the horrendous, spiralling toll of the US.

.

The mortality rate for Sweden has prompted even the Swedish chief medical scientist Dr Tegnell to comment that it is now a “horrifying large number” [‘Sweden’s near “horrifying” death toll of 3,000 from coronavirus with 87 new fatalities, including a child under ten’, (Ross Ibbotson), Daily Mail (UK), 07-May-2020, www.dailymail.co.uk]. The body responsible, the Swedish Public Health Agency has come under mounting pressure (increasingly internal) for the current situation. A group of 22 scientific researchers from Swedish universities and institutes have called on the SPHA for a rethink of the strategy and a more cautious approach [‘Sweden: 22 Scientists Say Coronavirus Strategy Has Failed’, (David Nikel), Forbes, 14-Apr-2020, www.forbes.com].

A consequence of “granny-killer metrics”  
A leading molecular virologist from Sweden’s Karolinska Insitutet has accused the government of taking unnecessary risks and sacrificing the elderly (half of the total deaths are from aged care homes), as well as placing the health of their carers and hospital workers in jeopardy [‘Sweden urged to reconsider controversial coronavirus advice as infections rise sharply’, (John Varga), Express, 07-May-2020, www.express.co.uk].

6E335F0B-0FF3-4FB2-AE0C-F1B11E0A7F32

A Stockholm bar: elbow distancing only

Defending the hard to defend
The Swedish authorities have tried to defend its strategy—citing dramatic drops in the use of public transport and a survey which the agencies conclude is evidence that people are practicing safe distancing from each other during the crisis (Ibbotson)—unfortunately the visual evidence from photos and videos within Sweden suggests otherwise with crowded restaurants, bars and parks still the norm and few people seeming to be social distancing. So far, the government for the most part is holding the line and appears to be committed to the long haul, although they have now given some ground, banning outdoor gatherings of more than 50 (Nikel).

There are some outside observers who still take a sanguine view of outlier Sweden’s methods of dealing with the crisis. Stanford School of Medicine (US) professor, Michael Levitt, has been critical of other countries with a different approach, the so-called “first mover” countries like Australia, Austria, New Zealand, Denmark, Czech Republic, Israel and Greece, who he says have paid too heavy a price for locking down their communities – resulting in severe damage to their economies, social upheaval, the loss of an academic year for students, and still having not attained herd immunity [‘Granny-killer metrics don’t add up in Australia’s costly coronavirus battle’, (Andrew Probyn), ABC News, 08-May-2020, www.abcnews.com.au]. No doubt the decision-makers in Sweden would find this external support comforting, and of course Sweden could turn around and say to the growing number of doubters that it’s approach is keeping people in jobs, keeping businesses from closing down, and the economy afloat … but at what a human cost! This is the Solomonic trade-off.

E3858AC7-3D57-4C4F-A051-D72859E40514

(Source: www.irishtimes.com)

Update since originally published(information updated to 21-May-2020) SWEDEN has overtaken the UK, Italy and Belgium to record the highest coronavirus per capita death rate in the world. Sweden has recorded 6.08 deaths per million inhabitants, higher than the UK, USA and Italy (www.express.co.uk/).

~

🇻🇳 Vietnam
With international media attention on the COVID-19 dilemma focused largely on the US and the Eurocentric world, the efforts of Vietnam in the war against coronavirus has garnered little notice till recently. Many observers would be surprised to discover that the South-East Asian country has had zero recorded deaths from the virus, out of a total of 288 confirmed cases (10-May-2020). Surprising…for a few reasons. First, it seems a bona fide claim, unlike some of it’s S.E. Asian neighbours who claim also to have done well with little to substantiate it. As a general rule, S.E. Asian numbers, even more so African numbers, are often problematic as there has been an inadequate amount of testing carried out to gauge progress accurately.

730D56F8-6E80-4D74-9D90-A90A3FCC1421

(Photo: AP)

Second, Vietnam shares a (northern) border with China, the country of coronavirus origin, plus in normal times Vietnam is a busy destination with frequent international flights from nearby Taiwan, Hong Kong and China itself, leaving it, one would think, quite susceptible to to the importation of the infection. Third, Vietnam has an estimated 97 million people but for a medical emergency of this magnitude it lacks the allocatable resources and health infrastructure of the more economically dynamic Asian states. It simply can’t afford to engage in the level of mass testing that say South Korea has managed [‘Vietnam shows how you can contain COVID-19 with limited resources’, (Sean Fleming), World Economic Forum, 30-Mar-2020, www.weforum.org].

C750DB29-3B54-4CBD-B86B-375614EAB02F

Why has Vietnam done so well in the war against the “invisible enemy”?
Part of the explanation is that Vietnam has approached the crisis very much like a military campaign. In fact war rhetoric has been employed by the government, which constantly speaks of “fighting the enemy”.  The country’s response was early and proactive, border closures, rigorous mass quarantines of whole towns for weeks, were implemented up front, not just as a last resort like some places elsewhere [‘How Vietnam is winning its “war” on coronavirus’, (Rodion Ebbighausen), DW, 16-Apr-2020, www.dw.com]. The authorities conducted targeted testing and thorough contact-tracing procedures. To compensate for the country’s limited resources they created low-cost test kits for wide distribution (“70-minute rapid test kits”).

A6CC16C9-E6A6-4813-A11A-AEF36EAE87A2

“Rice ATMs” initiative: Made available 24/7 to Vietnamese people during the time of pandemic  
(Photo:
www.vietnamnet.vn)

An ingrained culture of compliance 
The key to what Vietnam has achieved is the central government’s ability to secure almost universal integration into the fight against the disease. Communist Vietnam’s authoritarian one-party state structure with a highly organised army and security apparatus makes this task more easily obtainable (whereas in a liberal society where plurality is the norm this would be nigh on impossible). The regime can much more easily mobilise the people to adhere to it’s rules and restrictions…there is a prevailing culture of compliance, and a range of effective mechanisms in the hands of Hanoi to attain that compliance. The government-controlled media and the high numbers of Vietnamese people exposed  to social media have facilitated this. Apps have been a standard part of the public information campaign to get the government message out –  and the degree of transparency about COVID-19 and the government’s plan to counter-attack it, has raised public confidence and made it more receptive to what Hanoi is saying   [‘The Secret to Vietnam’s COVID-19 Response Success’, (Minh Vu & Bich T Tran), The Diplomat, 18-Apr-2020, www.thediplomat.com].

DC2AB93E-53FE-4E0D-A969-A48C722114F1
The government has called on a raft of idiosyncratically-Vietnamese cultural devices to creatively drive home it’s theme. ”Viral hand-washing” songs have been popularised among the people and most effectively, the regime have resorted to propaganda art, something with a long tradition in communist Vietnam. Calling on the familiar slogan, “In war, we draw” (again, invoking the war metaphor), the government has fostered a patriotic response in Vietnamese to get 100% behind the war on the virus (#TogetherWeWillWin), resulting in the production and dissemination of visually-powerful and meaningful posters like these two (above and below). COVID-19 has also prompted the release of special stamps to help unify the Vietnamese people [‘“In a war, we draw”: Vietnam’s artists joint fight against Covid-19’, (Chris Humphrey), The Guardian, 09-Apr-2020, www.theguardian.com; Fleming].

BB407FC2-CB14-47A8-A62A-597AFC7DE86D

Coercion and collaboration
Another side of Vietnam’s use of “soft power” to get everyone thinking as one can be seen at work in the coronavirus emergency. The socialist ethos in Vietnam operates on one level as a “surveillance state“…ordinary Vietnamese are conditioned, not just to obey rules, but to help the authoritarian regime’s realisation of it’s goals by spying on neighbours and reporting back to the authorities the activities of non-conformists or of anyone breaching the public health regulations (Humphrey).

Notwithstanding this further encroachment on civil liberties, the Vietnamese people as a whole, having accepted the seriousness of Hanoi’s fight against coronavirus, are on board, and appear genuinely proud of their country’s success in avoiding thus far any serious outbreak of the epidemic in a country with a healthcare system woefully ill-equipped to deal with harmful effects on it’s large population (Ebbighausen).

778EB116-CA30-4731-A3EE-645672B31BCF

The Vietnamese achievement, having been successful so far in keeping a lid on the epidemic, might lead it’s citizens to feel or at least hope that they are out of the woods. But even if they are in the clearing now, there’s another forest looming largely in the shape of the economy, which of course is another matter entirely. Over 85% of Vietnam’s enterprises have been adversely effected by the crisis. Tourism, which Vietnam like so many is highly dependent on,  could be looking at a loss of $US3 to $US4 Bn in 2020, and so on down the line of the country’s businesses. At the moment business leaders in Vietnam are preoccupied with exploring new economic opportunity that may arise for the country post-crisis [‘Vietnam is set to lose billions due to coronavirus, and it’s already feeling the impact of the deadly outbreak’, (Kate Taylor), Business Insider Australia, 25-Feb-2020, www.businessinsider.com.au].


EndNotePeering inside that can of worms
The UK Johnson government initially toyed with the idea of going the herd immunity route, before being awakened to it’s senses by a vociferous chorus of British medical experts recounting the dire ramifications of such a gamble. After chief epidemiologist Prof Neil Ferguson did some remodelling, the UK government (belatedly) switched to a suppression approach. The Netherlands in March announced it would follow Sweden’s strategy but the Dutch prime minister then walked back the herd immunity line, opting instead for what has been described as “lockdown light” [‘Caught Between Herd Immunity And National Lockdown, The Netherlands Hard Hit Bt Covid-19 (Update)’, (Joshua Cohen), Forbes, 27-Mar-2020, www.forbes.com]

─────
 the medical critics would be quick to point out that, if herd immunity can’t be accomplished by vaccination (and there is no vaccine for coronavirus yet, not even on the horizon), then it is an extremely risky business to dabble in. It puts the old and vulnerable into the position of sacrificial pawns for the greater good; it can also expose a country’s health-care system to intolerable demands on its resources (not to neglect the heightened personal danger for nursing staff and medics); a third drawback with the approach is that mortality from coronavirus is a reality for the under 70s and under 60s as well
 in an implicit admission of a failure of it’s voluntary compliance arrangements, Sweden announced recently that it would close bars and restaurants which flaunted the social distancing guidelines [‘Sweden is shutting down bars and restaurants where people defied social distancing guidelines’, (Kelly McLaughlin), Business Insider, 28-Apr-2020, www.businessinsider.com]
like Myanmar for instance which admits to only six deaths from the virus. A population of 55 million, according to a World Bank estimate it has only 249 ventilators in the whole country. The Myanmar regime’s lack of transparency, the sheer logistics of trying to safely social distances and the attribution of it’s very low fatality level to the country’s diet and lifestyle, cast more than reasonable doubts on the true extent of the epidemic in the republic [‘Zara’s Billionaire Owner Was Praised For Helping in the Coronavirus Crisis. Workers In Myanmar Paid the Price’, (Nishita Jha), BuzzFeed News, 07-May-2020, www.buzzfeed.com]

The Red Underground’s War on Bourgeois Capitalist Europe: Euro-terrorism in the 1970s, West Germany and Italy

Comparative politics, Political History, Popular Culture, Regional History, Social History

From the end of the Sixties the militant Weathermen in the US rode a global wave of youth and student rebellion against “the establishment” (see blog, 17-Jan-2020). Their emergence was in part a direct consequence of the student protests and violent clashes with the police and security forces that shook the leading cities of Europe and elsewhere in 1968 (the “Generation of 1968”). That same wave that gave impetus to the first stirrings of violent resistance by the Weathermen also ushered in other paramilitary organisations in Western Europe around the same time. The two of these that gained the most publicity/notoriety are discussed below.

West Germany: Red Army Faction (Ger: Rote Armee Fraktion) AKA Baader-Meinhof Gang

Ideology: anti-fascist, communist revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, anti-Zionist

The radical student critique: The West German “fascist state”

West German youth by the late 1960s were experiencing a sense of alienation from the Federal Republic (BDR). The source of this disquiet lay in the nature of West German society and politics. The BDR that they had grown up in was now prosperous, but it was moving away from the direction of liberalisation and reform toward a polity that was increasingly authoritarian under the veneer of democracy. The postwar West German government, allying itself to the US and to NATO, and with Berlin on the front line of the Cold War, was charting an increasingly illiberal course, as the country’s politicised youth saw it—the West German Communist Party had been banned in 1956; the police had violently over-reacted to student protests killing one unarmed student activist; the Brandt government had introduced the Radikalenerlass (German for “Radical decree”) law in 1972 barring radicals (as defined by the state) and those with a ‘questionable’ political persuasion from holding public sector jobs. Many in the student left railed against what they saw as hypocrisy from Bonn—assuming the guise of an advanced liberal democracy while at the same time hosting visits from ruthless dictators like the Shah of Iran, not to mention it’s other politically uncomfortable associations [‘Red Army Faction’, (Military Wiki), http://military.wiki.org].

The Wirtschftswunder (the West German “economic miracle”) and its creator, economics minister Erhard 🔻

Students and those on the left generally viewed the postwar denazification of West Germany with justifiable suspicion, it’s outcomes were ineffective and at best incomplete. The policy was breached repeatedly, eg, Chancellor Adenauer’s appointment of a former Nazi-sympathiser to high political office; even more alarmingly, Kurt Kiesinger, a former Nazi Party member, rose to the republic’s top political post, Bundesrepublikkanzler, in 1966; and many ex-Nazis were still able to walk into government positions at the local level up. Many on the left in the BDR were convinced that the republic’s conservative media, controlled by Axel Springer, was biased in favour of the establishment, while the more liberal press in BDR was heavily censored by the government. At the same time radicals looked on aghast when the two major parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, formed themselves into a “Grand Coalition” (‘Red Army Faction’, (Military Wiki).

As the succeeding generation, many students were left with a feeling of war-guilt as inheritors of the nation’s Nazi past. Added to this was the disillusion many Germans felt at their country being associated with a blatantly imperialist war in Vietnam. All of these dilemmas coalesced into a conviction for many on the left that the BDR government lacked legitimacy and was tantamount to a “fascist state”. Hence the collective call of West German youth for radical social change. The radicalisation of many in the republic’s student movement was partly fuelled by healthy doses of Marxist economic theory (it should be remembered that in 1966 the BDR economy had gone into recession—for the first time in 15 years) [‘German students campaign for democracy, 1966-68’, (Global Nonviolent Action Network), http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu].

BMGterrorising the BDR

Student disaffection and that of other activists in the West German New Left was rife, many protested their disapproval, some turned to more violent and direct ways of voicing their opposition. Into this turbulent milieu came, among others, the first incarnation of the Red Army Faction, better known courtesy of the media’s tag, the Baader-Meinhof Gang (BMG), at the end of the Sixties. Its founders and main leaders were Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin and Horst Mahler.

BMG started by engaging in arson as a protest against the Vietnam War and graduated to bomb attacks on US military facilities, German police stations and media outlets controlled by the Springer press. To bankroll their terrorist activities the gang robbed banks and kidnapped VIP hostages for ransom✫ [‘The Red Army Faction and the Stasi’, TELOSscope, 24-Oct-2016, (Review of Elliot Neaman’s Free Radicals), www.telospress.com; ‘Red Army Faction’, (Military Wiki)]. Among BMG’s victims were symbols of the BDR regime (individuals from the political and economic elites), US military personnel, as well as a number of unfortunate bystanders in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Despite killing some 34 people during its urban guerrilla ‘career’, RAF managed to elicit a measure of support from within West German society. For scores of disillusioned young West Germans at the time, there was support for or at least acceptance of RAF’s actions…(as Siegel put it), owing to the (still recent) Nazi legacy many “guilt-ridden liberals saw (RAF’s) panache as a countercultural critique of West Germany’s boring bourgeois life”. There is evidence also that there was collusion between BMG and East Germany and specifically the DDR’s Stasi (secret police) (Neaman). BMG also underwent some guerrilla training from the Palestinian al-Fatah in Jordan – which didn’t go exactly to plan. Andreas Baader, the group’s leader, deliberately cultivated an outlaw image, likening himself to Clyde Barrow (of Bonnie and Clyde criminal infamy) [‘The Romance of Evil’, by Fred Siegel, City Journal, 18-Sep-2009]§. Baader, Meinhof and their close associates were arrested in 1972 and the leaders died in custody within a few years—apparently by their own hands (though some are skeptical that these were in fact suicides).

Eponymous leaders of BMG 🔻

With the founding members in prison, a “second generation” of RAF cadres emerged, sympathetic to the group’s cause, picking up the terrorist-guerrilla baton where the incarcerated pioneers left off. This “RAF 2.0” was proactive between 1975 and 1979, especially during what became known as the “German Autumn” of 1977. They held personnel hostage at the West German embassy in Stockholm, perpetrated hits on public prosecutors and bankers, kidnapped industrialists, etc. ). In the 1980s and 1990s a” third generation” of RAF materialised and was intermittently active for some years, but since 1998 RAF has been considered to be moribund.

Italy: Red Brigades (It: Brigate Rosse)

Ideology: anti-fascist, communist revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist

As with their West German counterpart, the Red Brigades (BR) had its antecedents in the massive-scale student protests of 1968 against the state, and the workers’ struggles in Italy in 1968-69 to bring about social and political change. The militant organisation was formed from a leftist student group at the University of Trento in Italy’s north set up by Renato Curcio and Margherita Cagol. BR claimed a membership of up to 1,000 strong at its peak (others have put it at about 400 to 500 full-time members) plus an indeterminate number of supporters [“Years of Lead” — Domestic Terrorism and Italy’s Ref Brigades’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, www.adst.org ; Sundquist, Major Victor H. “Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades.” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 3 (2010) : 53-68. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.3.5. Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss3/5].

CDP-PCI’s “compromiso storico”

In Italy BR was able to tap into the prevailing student and worker discontent with the government (at first through it’s grass-root activism in northern industrial cities like Milan and Turin). Many radicalised sections of Italian workforce were disillusioned by the ‘historic’ coalition formed between the conservative Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and a belief lingered that PCI’s deal with the main bourgeois party would not ultimately represent the interests of the country’s working class (Sundquist) (cf. the CDU/SDP coalition in West Germany).

Red Brigades in “the Years of Lead”

From the early to the late 1970s BR unleashed a series of terror strikes, a chapter in what became known in Italy as “the Years of Lead” (It: Anni di piombo), which was a longer period of postwar social and political turmoil in Italy characterised by terrorist attacks from both right- and left-wing paramilitary groups. Material help for BR was forthcoming from the USSR and Czechoslovakia (weaponry). After the arrest of Curcio and Cagol in 1974, a “second generation” of radicals took up the ‘war’ against the Italian authorities. The act most associated with the BR Mach II (now led by Mario Moretti) and earning it its greatest opprobrium was the kidnapping and eventual murder of former Italian prime minister, Aldo Moro in 1978. BR’s murder of the highly popular Moro lost it much public support, including that of some sections of the left.

The assassination of Moro galvanised the national government, the Italian security forces and the Carabinieri into launching an all-out war against the leftist terrorist organisation. With a more concerted counter-terrorist strategy including intelligence from paid informers, the authorities were ultimately successful in capturing the leaders and a large chunk of BR cadres, effectively eliminating the threat to the country during the 1980s. [‘The Red Brigades’, Wikipedia, http://en.m.wikipedia.org ; ‘Years of Lead (Italy)’, Wikipedia, http://en.m.wikipedia.org; Sundquist]. Despite its eventual failure and demise, BR was lethally effective in its methods – between 1973 and 1994 the terrorist group killed 223 people in its assaults (Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland). One academic calls it “the most menacing radical group in Italys post-WWII history”, [‘Learning from the Past: Case of the Red Brigades in Italy’, Daniela Irrera, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. Vol. 6, No 6 (JULY 2014]. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. URL: www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26351263].

Methods of the “Red Euro-terrorists”

Both RAF and BR used similar tactics and strategies – primarily sabotage, arson, bank robberies, kidnappings and assassinations. The human targets were generally politicians (almost all right-wing), senior police, judges, industrialists and bankers, though BR also went after trade union officials in Italy which eventually helped undermine its support. Initially, BR refrained from lethal violence, often inflicting the punishment of aginocchiare (kneecapping) on its selected targets. But, as the Seventies rolled on, they were taking a more direct and extreme retribution on the capitalist state expanding the scope of terror to murder.

RAF ‘wanted’ poster (source: www.vukutu.com)

These two far-left European terrorist groups according to their pronouncements shared roughly the same broad, radical objectives as the Weather Underground – to destabilise the state and bring down the country’s capitalist regime◘. The two, also like the Weathermen, took great inspiration and more than a few tips from the Tupamaros urban guerrilla group of Uruguay. The Weather, BR and RAF all pursued a avowedly violent strategy against the authorities, but the Weathermen, when compared to BR and RAF, were “terrorism-lite”. Whereas the Weather targeted material damage only, meticulously avoiding the endangering of human life, the two European terrorist groups had no such compunctions or qualms.

Endnote: RAF and BR – red militants in a crowded field of left-wing Euro-terrorists

Neither RAF in Germany or BR in Italy were sole traders in the leftist-terrorism game in their respective countries, such is the splintering nature of ultra-left, extremist groups. There were a string of other terrorist groups operating at the same time, the most consequential of these were Prima Linea (Italian for “First Line”) in Italy and the Revolutionary Cells (Ger: Revolutionäre Zellen – RZ) in West Germany—the latter having a lower profile than RAF but actually perpetrating more bomb and arson attacks on the state than it (Military Wiki).

◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘◙◘ ◙◘ ◙◘

sometimes also called Baader-Meinhof Group. Red Army Faction was its official organisational name

BR went one better in fund-raising it’s revolutionary mission, getting involved in drugs and arms trafficking which included doing business with the Neapolitan mafia, the Camorra (‘Red Brigades’, Wiki)

§ a trait shared by the Weathermen

◘ BR also had another, more specific objective of wanting to force Italy to leave NATO

this did not stop BR Mach II from making one more high-profile kidnapping, that of American deputy chief of staff of NATO (General Dozier) in 1981. Italian police managed to rescue the general unharmed and Italian and NATO security forces executed successful retaliatory action again BR (Sundquist)

BR though didn’t entirely disappear…after it split into two separate groups in the early 1980s, the more hardline splinter group continued into the 2000s (amounting to a third organisation claiming to represent BR)

Mengjiang: The Empire of Japan’s Other East Asian Puppet State in Inner Mongolia

Comparative politics, Inter-ethnic relations, International Relations, Military history, National politics, Political geography, Regional History, Travel

The creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo out of a huge chunk of China’s northeastern territory in 1932 was a springboard for Japan’s nationalists and militarists to expand territorially deep into China and other parts of Eastern Asia [see preceding blog: http://www.7dayadventurer.com/2019/06/27/manchukuo-an-instrument-of-imperial-expansion-for-the-puppet-masters-of-japan/].

(note how close Mengjiang’s eastern boundary came to China’s principal city Peking)

The Japanese military used Manchukuo as a base to gradually move piece by piece into Chinese Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Siberia and elsewhere in China. Or as one Western observer of the day put it: “Automatically, by the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Japan became committed to the invasion of Mongolia”, [Lattimore, Owen. “The Phantom of Mengkukuo.” Pacific Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4, 1937, pp. 420–427. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2750626].

Demchugdongrub and his Japanese advisors

▫️▫️▫️

Demchugdongrub, Pan-Mongolism to vassal state
In Inner Mongolia, a member of the Royal House of Chahar, Prince Demchugdongrub (Te Wang 德王), was agitating in the 1930s for Mongolian autonomy from Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Republic of China. Demchugdongrub and other Mongolian nationalists harboured irredentist desires for a Pan-Mongolia (the reuniting of Inner and Outer Mongolia) [‘5. Another Manchu-kuo, the dream of the “Inner Mongolian Independence”‘, TAKESHITA, Yoshirō 1997, http://teikoku-denmo.jp/ cited in Global Security, GlobalSecurity.org)].

Mengjiang flag

▫️▫️▫️

Enforced mergers and shifting nomenclature
The opportunity arose with the aggressive expansion of the Japanese military into the country. Chahar and Suiyuan provinces in Inner Mongolia were taken by Japan’s Kwantung Army and its allies. With the muscle of the occupying Japanese military behind him, Demchugdongrub in 1936 was installed as the leader of a new puppet-state regime✳️, the Mongol Military Government (sometimes also called the “Mongolian Border Land”).

In 1939 South Chahar and North Shanxi provinces (both predominately Han Chinese in population✥) were added to the ‘Mongolian’ regime, now renamed the Mengjiang(or Mongol) United Autonomous Government (蒙疆聯合自治政府) (Měngjiāng Liánhé Zìzhì Zhèngfǔ Mōkyō Rengō Jichi Seifu) with its capital in Kalgan (Zhāngjiākǒu) [ibid.]. On paper Prince Demchugdongrub remained Mengjiang head of state (until 1945), his main function seems to have been to give the territorial entity the countenance of legitimacy. One manifestation of Mengjiang’s Mongolian roots was Demchugdongrub’s adoption of the historic Mongolian calendar…1936, Mengjiang’s creation year, became the year 781 to associate the regime with Genghis Khan (below) and the height of power of the Mongol Empire [John Man, The Mongol Empire: Genghis Khan, His Heirs and the Founding of Modern China, (2015)]✧.

▫️▫️▫️

MUAG becomes MAF
In 1941 Mengjiang was rebranded once more, this time as the Mongolian Autonomous Federation (蒙古自治邦). At the same time the Japanese sponsored the elevation of Wang Zhao-ming. Wang, better known by his pen-name of Wang Jingwei, was put in charge of the Reorganised National Government of the Republic of China (中華民國國民政府) (RNGRC)❦. Wang had previously lost out to Chiang Kai-shek in a leadership struggle for control of both the KMT and the Chinese government.

Wang Jingwei, RNGRC president

Wang’s defection to the Japanese was motivated by this and he envisioned his alternate government, RNGRC, would provide him with the power base within China he was seeking▣. With Wang’s appointment as “Chinese president”, Demchugdongrub’s MAF was subsumed under the Wang regime, but in practical terms the MAF was still autonomous of it, if not of the Japanese [‘Mengjiang’, (Military Wiki), www.military.wikia.org].

Mengjiang one yuan note

▫️▫️▫️

RNGRC a ‘toothless’ regime
The RNGRC under Wang was a one-party totalitarian dictatorship, but the reality of Wang Jingwei’s regime was that it was only afforded very limited powers by it’s Japanese masters. Wang, befitting the function of a pliable puppet, was basically no more than a convenient pawn for the Japanese military to negotiate with Chiang’s government [‘Wang Jianwei regime’, Wikipedia, http://en.m.wikipedia.org]. In 1944 Wang died in Japan…his successor as president mayor of Shanghai Chen Gongbo played an equally subservient role for the Kwantung (Chen in 1946 was tried as a war criminal by the Chiang government and executed).

Mongolian flag 1945▫️▫️▫️

At the end of WWII, both the Mengjiang regime of Demchugdongrub and the ‘Reorganised’ Republic of China were effortlessly swept away by the invading Soviet and Mongolian armies. The Inner Mongolian territories were returned to China (along with Chinese Manchuria) and the Soviet satellite Outer Mongolia gained independence after a national plebiscite (100% yes vote!) in late 1945 (which the USSR immediately and China later recognised).

PRTT crest

PostScript: Tannu Tuva, a regional curio Mengjiang (or Mengkukuo) and Manchukuo were not the only contemporary puppet states in that region of Northeastern China/Mongolia. Nestled in between Outer Mongolia and Russian Siberia, is the tiny enclave of Tannu Tuva (1944: 170,500 sq km, Pop. 95,400)…historically this land was part of Mongolia and therefore part of a client state of the Chinese Empire. The People’s Republic of Tannu Tuva (ʙа Arat Respuʙlik) (1921-44) was recognised only by the USSR and Mongolia. Nominally independent but in reality another satellite state of the Soviets, in late 1944 it was absorbed into the Soviet Union as the Tuvan Autonomous Oblast. Today, it is the Tyva Republic, a constituent member of the post-communist Russian Federation.

(map source: www.globalsecurity.org)

➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖➖

✳️ Demchugdongrub, despite his vaulting ambitions, was only ever nominally in charge of what was always transparently a Japanese-controlled puppet state

✥ exacerbating pre-existing tensions between the Mongolian and Chinese sections of the state (Lattimore, op.cit.)

Mengjiang 蒙 (literally ‘fierce’ or in compound form ‘dream to act’). The entity is sometimes styled Mengkukuo 蒙古國 because of its parallels with Manchukuo

✧ the Mongolian prince’s supposed autonomy was always surface deep at best…”an autonomy administered by the Japanese for the Japanese”, (ibid.)

❦ colloquially known as the “Wang Jingwei regime

▣ Wang’s would-be government was based in the former capital Nánjīng, however the de facto capital was Shanghai

.