Coronavirus and Age Vulnerability: The Riddle of Japan

National politics, Politics, Public health,, Regional History, Society & Culture

Both the medical experts and the empirical evidence on the ground tell us that the elderly are the cohort in the community most susceptible to COVID-19. The Office of National Statistics (UK) calculates that people aged 80 and over have >59% risk of dying from coronavirus (www.ons.gov.uk/). The pandemic’ age bias skewed against older populations is one explanation, in the absence of much hard data, put forward to explain the African continent’s current low rate of mortality due to the virus – overall 111,812 confirmed cases and only 3,354 deaths (as at 25-May-2020) [‘Coronavirus in Africa tracker’, BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk/]. The percentage of the African population aged under 25 is 60% (in sub-Saharan Africa the number over 65 is only 3%)[‘Coronavirus in Africa reaches new milestone as cases exceed 100,000’, (Orion Rummler), Axion, 22-May-2020, www.axios.com].

And if we needed any more empirical proof of the salience of the age factor, there is the tragic example of Italy’s corona-toll. 32,785 dead from COVID-19 in a country with the oldest population in Europe. Nearly 58% of the country’s deaths in the pandemic have been Italians aged 80 and over [Statistica Research Department, (22-May-2020), www.statista.com/].

4E0F4A05-F587-45ED-BC34-E10F32BB0CFBWith Italy’s grim corona-death tally falling disproportionately heavily on the country’s senectitude, you would think that it would not bode well for Japan which has the world’s highest percentage of older people (28.2% aged 65 and more) [Population Reference Bureau, www.pbr.org/]. When you add in other demographic factors relevant to Japan, this would seem doubly ominous for the “land of the rising sun” – a population of >126 millions on a land area of 377,944 sq km, including the mega-city of Tokyo  with its notoriously packed commuter trains. On top of all these is Japan’s proximity to China, the virus’ original causal point.

5D9AD46E-EC6D-4A4A-8EE6-807151473056

(Source: www.quora.com)

Japan, unpropitious conditions for avoiding an global epidemic?
With such cards stacked against it, worried Japanese health officials might have feared a catastrophe eventuating on the scale of that befalling the US, Italy and UK. And Japan has not come out of the pandemic unscathed but the result-to-date (25-May-2020)—16,550 confirmed cases and 820 deaths—is much better than many comparably sized and larger countries. Of course, Japan’s  public health authorities are very mindful, as is every country, of being swamped by a second wave of the coronavirus. 

314F9800-6451-42C9-A075-2DF2BE2CE2E3

(Photo: www.english.kyodonews.net)

How has Japan done as well as it has?  
Good question! The Japanese themselves can’t really explain how they’ve managed to escape a major outbreak of the virus. WHO has called it a “success story”, but it’s one that continues to mystify. In so far as explanations were forthcoming from Japan’s health ministry, it was attributed at least in part to a raft of cultural factors. First, hygiene and cleanliness is something ingrained in the Japanese psyche, Japanese people tend not to shake hands and hugs others, preferring to bow as the form of greeting. Second, the practice of wearing face masks was already the norm in Japan ante-COVID-19 (the Japanese go through 5.5bn a year, averaging 43 per head of population) [‘Most coronavirus success stories can be explained. Japan’s remains a ‘mystery’’, (Jake Sturmer & Yumi Asada), ABC News, 23-May-2020, www.abc.com.au; ’How Japan keeps COVID-19 under control’, (Martin Fritz), DM, 25-Mar-2020, www.dm.com].

Other cultural factors 
Other suppositions put forward to explain the Japanese success include the practice of inoculating young children with BCG vaccinations, which according to its advocates give Japanese people a basic immunity which helps their defence against coronavirus. Physiology was also cited as a factor in guarding against the disease, the low obesity of Japanese is thought to help, as is the Japanese diet (eg, natto, a soybean yoghurt, is thought to boost the immune system) [‘’From near disaster to success story: how Japan has tackled coronavirus’, (Justin McCurry), The Guardian, 23-May-2020, www.msn.com/; ‘Has Japan dodged the coronavirus bullet?’, Richard Carter & Natsuko Fuhue, Yahoo News, 14-May-2020, www.au.news.yahoo.com; Sturmer & Asada].

0D6D14EF-E00D-43E9-A6B0-96CDBA642E5E

(Photo: www..Forbes.com)

The “Diamond Princess”
In addition to all of the domestic factors hindering Japan’s fight against COVID-19, an external element exacerbating the early outbreak in Japan was the debacle of the “Diamond Princess” cruise ship. When the international ship docked at Yokohama in February, the Japanese authorities injudiciously prevented healthy passengers and crew on-board from disembarking during the quarantine – with no separation made between well and contaminated passengers, and no self-isolation of the sick! This led to a blow-out of virus contamination which eventually infected 712 passengers, creating the first big cluster of coronavirus outside of Wuhan [‘How lax rules and missed warnings led to Japan’s second coronavirus-hit cruise ship’, (Ju-Min Park), The Japan Times, 07-May-2020, www.japantimes.co.jp]

41EB7732-969F-40E2-B732-BAC43D9EF20B

A cautious reaction from politicians, one eye on the XXXII Olympiad?
Let’s look in detail at what Japan did – or didn’t do! When the disease first arrived, the government took a cautious approach to tackling the virus. Borders initially remained open and Chinese visitors were still allowed into the country in huge numbers, 89,000 came in February (after the first outbreak), which was on top of the 925,000 who visited during January! Prime Minister Abe came in for a lot of flak, some including a former PM, Yukio Hatoyama, accused him of holding off from going full-tilt against the pandemic so as to preserve the Tokyo Olympics event (Fritz). Critics railed against a lack of leadership  from the Abe government, criticising its failure to appoint anyone to take firm control of the crisis, and that those efforts to counter the virus were hamstrung by the multiplication of bureaucratic silos [‘A Japan divided over COVID-19 control’, (Hiromi Murakami), East Asia Forum, 08-Mar-2020, www.eastasiaforum.org].

Lockdown-lite, testing-lite
The Abe government’s belated state of emergency saw sport suspended and schools closed,  but overall only a partial lockdown was imposed, many businesses, restaurants were permitted to stay open, albeit with reduced hours. Citizens were asked to stay home but compliance was only on a voluntary basis, with no surveillance technology deployed and no punitive action taken against anyone failing to adhere to the government’s request.

E9A72ED4-14DC-4A46-9E41-40E010868FE8
(Image: www.japantimes.co.jp)

Targeted testing

It was in testing that Japan adopted a very different crisis approach to most of the leading western countries. Rather than going for high volume, it deliberately tested under capacity. By mid-May it had tested a mere 0.185% of the country’s population, averaging two tests per 1,000 people, cf. Australia, >40 per 1,000 (Sturmer & Asada). It was highly selective, only those with serious virus symptoms were tested. The rationale for such a low-testing regime was concern for the capacity of widespread testing infrastructure, by limiting testing this would lighten the load on testing centres. Rather than mine-sweep the country with testing, the Japanese pursued a strategy of targeting virus clusters as they were identified to pinpoint the sources of the infection [‘Has Japan found a viable long-term strategy for the pandemic’, (Kazuto Suzuki), The Diplomat, 24-Apr-2020, www.thediplomat.com; Gramenz].

Consequently, Japanese medical experts concede that the official counts may be well short of the reality, which puts a rider on the country’s achievement. Even with a smaller number of cases Japan found itself lacking in IPUs (only five per 100,000 people cf. 35 in the US) , there was also a shortage of PPE as well as face masks which were rationed out only two per household (and derided as “Abe-no masks”). This calls into question the faith that the Japanese placed in the robustness of the nation’s health system [‘Japan’s Halfhearted Coronavirus Measures Are Working Anyway’, (William Sposato), Foreign Policy Magazine, 14-May-2020, www.foreignpolicy.com].

Self-complying social distancing?
Social distancing, a nightmare to try to enforce in people-dense Tokyo, was not a major focus for authorities. This was largely left to the goodwill of the individual, aided by some subtle social shaming – government workers walking through Tokyo nightlife areas with signs asking people to go home (Sposato). In any event the authorities’ measures were only partly effective – Japanese people continue to flock to the cherry blossom spring events in large numbers. Where social distancing was more manageable was in shutting off obvious potential hotspots, closed spaces with poor ventilation (karaoke clubs and pubs), crowded places with many people people in the immediate vicinity and other close, intimate contact settings (Suzuki).

0D10DA6D-10A8-4290-96EF-C6A0276AF7B8
Cherry blossom time: no voluntary social distancing here (Photo: www.bloomberg.com)

Tokyo transport
Tokyo’s mass transit network is a petri dish in-waiting for coronavirus, but it appears that preventive measures (some pre-planned) have lessened the impact on public health. Tokyo business working hours have been staggered and large companies like NEC started to adopt telecommuting and teleworking, as well as a big increase of people riding bikes to work occurring. Consequently, transits at Tokyo’s central station on May 18th was down by 73% on the corresponding day in 2019 [‘Remote possibilities: Can every home in Japan become an office?’, (Alex Martin), The Japan Times, 23-May-2020, www.japantimes.co.jp]. 

6E518C74-22F0-4E2B-8C28-72D9F41171A8

(Image: Getty Images/AFP. P Fong)

Most pundits and observers conclude that Japan, with its ageing population and all its drawbacks and encumbrances, has (so far) warded off the worst of the pandemic. With no “silver bullet” in sight, we are left to speculate whether that they have achieved this outcome by sheer good luck, by good judgement, by the personal habits and cultural traits (especially hygiene) of its citizens, or by a combination of all of the above (McCurry).

Endnote: Low tester, early starter
Another Asian country which has mirrored Japan’s pattern of choosing not to test in high volumes is Taiwan. The Taipei China republic, commencing measures to counter the virus as early as anyone did, had tested only 2,900 people per million of population (Worldometer, as at 20th May), but it’s mortality rate (deaths per million) was only 0.3 (total of seven deaths) compared to Japan which was 6.0 per million.

˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚˙˙˚
as at 25-May-2020
the largest metropolis prefecture in the world, around 14 million people
Japan’s health officials had themselves projected a worse-case scenario of up to 400,000 deaths (Gramenz)
to be fair, there are constitutional impediments in Japan that prevent the declaration of a full, European-style lockdown (McCurry)
a Kyodo news poll indicated that 57.5% of people were unhappy with the government’s handling of the emergency. In so far as Japanese people have given credit to the success, it has gone to medical experts for efficiently managing Japan’s cluster tracing and containment efforts, rather than to Abe who many view with distrust based on its past track record [‘Time to Give Japan Credit for its COVID-19 Response’, (Rob Fahey & Paul Nadeau), Tokyo Review, 18-May-2020, www.tokyoreview.net]

The Kerala COVID-19 Template: How to Lead in the Fight against a Pandemic

Comparative politics, Natural Environment, Politics, Public health,

When the coronavirus pandemic eventually reached India, it was always going to pose a challenge of epic proportions for a country of 1.3+ billion people, with such a dense population domiciled  in such close quarters, and with a widespread underbelly of poverty. The Spanish flu of 1918 inflicted a death toll on India in the many millions, something no doubt in the back of the minds of public health officials. So, two or three months into the crisis, on paper, India’s COVID-19 record, on paper, doesn’t look as frightening as many other nations. As at 17-May-2020, so far it has had a shade under 91 thousand confirmed cases and a total of 2,872 deaths (www.worldometers.info).

10D13447-6663-4F6D-9AD9-DBCF18F47F5E

(Photo: Indranil Mukherjee / Agence France-Presse – Getty Images)

There is a perception within medical circles however that these figures don’t portray the full extent of the outbreak. India’s urban areas are packed with masses of people living face to face, beset with poor sanitation conditions, up to 100 people sharing the same toilet in some cases, adding up to a recipe for catastrophe in plague time. Obtaining a test for coronavirus in India has tended to not be straightforward, thus the level of testing has lagged woefully behind what is desirable, eg, by well into March India was averaging only five tests per ten lakhs (one million) people, compared with South Korea which had managed 4,800 per ten lakhs.

FEA14576-4FB7-40F2-902D-CB14B95FC9CD

Too many migrant workers waiting for too few buses to take them home after the lockdown was announced (Photo: Yawar Nazir – Getty Images)

Containment measures have been far short of perfect, and with some glaring omissions…there has been passive resistance to the lockdowns from sceptical Indians, and the ban on public gatherings has from time to time been skirted round (some ‘scofflaw’ political parties continue to hold mass rallies). Although India’s borders were closed fairly promptly, some have been critical of the procrastination of Indian leaders’ during the crucial early days of the crisis, one Indian epidemiologist characterised it as a “let’s wait till tomorrow” attitude [‘India Scrambles to Escape a Coronavirus Crisis. So Far It’s Working’, (J Gettleman, S Raj, KD Singh & K Schultz), New York Times, 17-March-2020, www.nytimes.com]. This early reticence to act emanated from Delhi. The Modi BJP government, initially seemingly more concerned with the impact on India’s under-performing economy, issued no public health warnings or media briefings at the onset of the pandemic [‘What the world can learn from Kerala about how to fight covid-19’, (Sonia Faleiro), MIT Technology Review, 13-Apr-2020, www.technologyreview.com].

776067EA-29C5-4453-8379-1B7A7AB04BAF

(www.anayahotels.com)

Kerala, leading from the periphery
Kerala is one state that these general criticisms of Indian public health efforts against COVID-19 cannot be levelled. The small southwestern Indian state is one of the most picturesque parts of the land with its coconut trees and irenic and serene back-waterways. Known as a tourist mecca, Kerala, population 35 million, is more affluent than many parts of India (GDP per capital GB£2,200). 20% of India’s gold is consumed here, and it produces over 90% of the country’s rubber. Literacy is nearly 20% higher than the overall Indian average, and life expectancy too, is higher (www.holidify.com). All of these were contributing factors buttressing Kerala’s capacity to cope with the disease when it came.

Local vulnerabilities to the epidemic
Kerala was coronavirus “ground zero” for India’s very first patients. Three students returning from Wuhan were tested positive and hospitalised (in all 70% of the state’s total virus patients have come from outside India). Certain preconditions pertaining to the state exacerbated the risk of disease outbreak, including a large number of Keralite migrant workers in the Gulf states, a huge expat population (working in Kerala from other Indian states), porous borders, and an early summer monsoon season (contributing to Kerala’s high rate of annual communicable diseases) [‘Coronavirus: How India’s Kerala state flattened the curve’, (Soutik Biswas), BBC News, 16-Apr-2020, www.bbcnews.com].

Preparation and planning
Kerala was prepared for COVID-19 before the onset of the disease. The earlier Nipah viral outbreak (NiV) In Kerala (2018) proved a good trial run for the health service, giving the local authorities an opportunity to iron out chinks in it. Kerala’s communist-left coalition  government had established a strong social welfare foundation, investing in the state’s infrastructure with a focus on health and education, and on tackling the state’s poverty. [‘How the Indian State of Kerala flattened the coronavirus curve’, (Oommen C Kurian), Guardian,  21-Apr-2020, www.theguardian.com].

Minister Shailaja (Source: www.manoramonline.com)

B2E20FBF-77CE-4ADA-81DF-901D82E34F63

Shailaja ‘Teacher’, a woman with a plan
When the epidemic arrived in Kerala, the proactive state health minister KK Shailaja took charge. With the full backing of Kerala chief minister, Pinarayi Vijayan, she had already organised a rapid response team to focus on targeted clusters, and liaised with the provincial councils. Kerala adopted the WHO protocols of test, trace, isolate and support. Rigorous contact tracing was employed, utilising detailed “route maps”. Testing of suspected carriers was decisive, with a quick, 48-hour turnaround of the result [‘Kerala has best coronavirus test rate in the country, but is it enough?’, (Vishnu Varna), The Indian Express, 01-Apr-2020, www.indianexpress.com], allowing them to move quickly on to the quarantine phase. 17,000 people were quarantined under strict surveillance, the poor without quarantine facilities were placed in improvised isolation. Recovered patients were duly released back into the community. Quarantine compliance was achieved through an admixture of phone monitoring (>340,000 calls and a neighbourhood watch system [‘The coronavirus slayer! How Kerala’s rock star health minister helped save it from Covid-19’, (Laura Spinney), The Guardian, 14-May-2020, www.theguardian.com; Kurian].

One of the sternest challenges, very early on, came from the district of Pathanamthitta. A family returning from Italy tested positive, but refused to disclose their movements upon return to Kerala. The civil servant in charge of the district, PB Nooh, and his team, worked round this obstacle by accessing the family’s GPS phone data, allowing them to trace all of their contacts (almost 300 people!). Nooh’s staff then tested the contacts for infection, thus shutting down the risk of the virus being exponentially transmitted to others in the community, ie, “breaking the chain” (Faleiro).

The coronavirus certainly didn’t miss Kerala, one-fifth of all Indian cases of the disease have occurred in the state. Under Shailaja, Kerala hit the ground running, before the end of January, screenings of arrivals at all four of the state’s international airports was introduced. The government imposed a lockdown even before the national lockdown was called…schools, malls, cinemas, public gatherings, were closed down, and the lockdown was stricter and longer than the national one (Kurian). Face masks were distributed to slum dwellers. Planning was precise and focused, a state stimulus package of Rs20,000 crore was directed towards the economic and medical crises.The medical task force was mobilised (doctors on leave were recalled, others asked to delay their leave). Those suffering hardship included migrant workers from other states were provided with free lunches by the state.

B04DBE9E-3431-45D1-BEAC-30319F69C38A

Communication with citizens informing them about all aspects of the crisis was clear and consistent (“Break the Chain” campaign which emphasises public and personal hygiene). Accordingly, community participation, both voluntary and active, was forthcoming. Some Keralites made accommodation available (including vacant homes in some instances) to those in need when requested to by the government [‘The Kerala Way of Tackling a Pandemic’, Times of India, 20-Mar-2020, www.timesofindia.com].

The Kerala government’s campaign against the virus has been aided by the polity’s decentralised nature of it’s structures. The coordination achieved allows the local councils to follow through on a lot of the public health measures needed to be implemented in the crisis (Biswas). The result of all this detailed planning and effort by Kerala – 587 confirmed cases and only four deaths and apparently no significant community transmissions (17-Apr-2020).

The state of Kerala and Shailaja ‘Teacher’ (so known because her occupation before entering politics was that of science teacher) are not resting on their laurels, being very mindful of the chance of a second wave of COVID-19 due to impending factors—Prime Minister Modi’s anticipated ending of the national lockdown, which will trigger a mass return of Kerala’s migrant workers based in the Gulf, and the approach of the tropical wet season in Kerala (June) [‘Kerala Lays Down Specific Plans To Tackle Monsoon Amid COVID-19 Pandemic’, NDTV, 15-May-2020, www.ndtv.com]. Minister Shaijala has been making preparations for such an event, many of the state’s teachers have been retrained as nurses to cope with a new upsurge in virus hotspots (Spinney).

2A2FC331-A536-4476-B682-D925116408D1

EndNote: No time for Kerala complacency but a most worthy blueprint on offer 
The threat of new clusters emerging in Kerala remains very real, especially coming from outside, with a spike as recent as this past Friday—imported from neighbouring Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra as well as from overseas—reminding Shailaja and Co that the battle’s still far from won. Nonetheless, for elsewhere in India and beyond, there are lessons from Kerala‘s formidable achievement to be had from the state’s “nimble-footed, community-oriented, cautiously-aggressive approach” to the outbreak [Kurian; ‘Kerala reports 11 new Covid-19 cases’, (Ramesh Babu), Hindustan Times,16-May-2020, www.hindustantimes.com].

₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪₪

the Kerala government is Marxist in ideology but pragmatic in practice, it’s policies are moderately social-democratic, with a highly-privatised public health system (Kurian)

Revisiting the Coronavirus Origin Theories

Medical history, Natural Environment, Public health,, Regional History, Science and society

2C967F37-473B-4AA7-B31F-106A0E8D4002

(Image: KPBS)

China notified the World Health Organisation on 31 December 2019 of a series of “pneumonia-like” cases popping up in Wuhan, however it took some time for peripheral parts of the country to get wind of the burgeoning health crisis. Information from the government, when it did come, was pretty sketchy in the early stages of the outbreak. Soon after Chinese migrant workers began returning home from Wuhan, rumours of what might have caused the virus started to circulate in the regions.

7078779E-6F23-46C7-B0BA-70CDCB642912

Zoonotic source
As the infection rates in Wuhan and Hubei province started to steeple in early February, there was lots of speculations about animal transmission to coronavirus’ “Patient Zero”. Civets, snakes, seafood, wolf cubs, rats—all live wildlife sold at the Wuhan ‘wet’ markets—got mentions as possible candidates for transmission. The story most heard and retold at the time was that it was bats that had transmitted the pathogen to humans at the Hua’nan markets⌧  (‘How It All Started: China’s Early Coronavirus Missteps’, (J Page, WX Fan & N Khan), WSJ, 06-Mar-2020), www.wsj.com). The Rhinolophus bat (Horseshoe bat) has been identified as the specific type of bat likely to have carried the infection (‘Coronavirus animal origin’, Crikey, 16-Apr-2020, www.crickey.com.au). A few weeks later there was a new prime suspect – the pangolin, the world’s most trafficked mammal. Chinese virologists⚘ had traced the virus to pangolins being sold at those same seafood markets in Wuhan (‘Mystery deepens over animal source of coronavirus’, (David Cyrenoski), Nature, 26-Feb-2020, www.nature.com).

1665E722-0999-415F-A2C6-3DE90D2F6F06

 (Image: Frans Lanting / National Geographic)

The inevitable conspiracy theories: Genetically-engineered virus
Since February China and the US have exchanged accusations that Covid-19 was deliberately created as a biological weapon—all without foundation (‘No, COVID-19 Coronavirus Was Not Bioengineered. Here’s The Research That Debunks That Idea’,  (Bruce Y Lee), Forbes, 17-Mar-2020, www.forbes.com). Chinese officials have also made the wild claim that the US Army brought the virus to Wuhan when it participated in the Military Games in the city in October last year. 

B041C7DB-C8DE-46DD-9276-AA94462605CD🔺 Wuhan markets (Photo: NOEL CELIS /AFP via Getty Images)

Over the last couple of months, another story disseminated by southern Republicans has been doing the rounds of the conservative media in America. It espouses the view that coronavirus originated not from a wet market but from a biosafety lab in Wuhan (Wuhan Institute of Virology), from an accidental leakage. Again this view is bereft of any hard evidence to support it but this hasn’t stopped President Trump and his allies at Fox from seizing on it! (“’Biological Chernobyl’: How China’s secrecy fueled coronavirus suspicions”, (Q Forgey, D Lippmann, N Bertrand & L Morello), Politico, 17-Apr-2020, www.politico.com).

While Covid-19 continues to wreak its trail of carnage worldwide, media and social media platforms will no doubt continue to throw up theories about the causes but until China releases the clinical and epidemiological data on the Wuhan outbreak,  the pandemic’s precise origin cannot be scientifically determined (Politico).3747AFE1-BAC3-4B1C-8F33-BF283C622CD2

🔺 Exporting America’s homegrown “Gates-gate”conspiracy – ‘Covidiocy‘ to Melbourne
(Photo: AAP/Ricky Barbour)

______________________________________________
⌧ bats are major reservoirs of many viruses, and prevalent in both the SARS and MERS outbreaks
scientific evidence for the pangolin as the culprit is based on a high match of its genome sequencing with that of SARS-CoV-2, however the research remains unpublished and therefore unreviewed; it is thought that pangolins may have been intermediate hosts for the disease …
bat pangolin human
these are only the less implausible theories, a raft of other ludicrous and wacky conspiratorial notions have been floated purporting to explain the epidemic’s genesis – ranging from Bill Gates having manufactured the virus to establish  himself as the ‘Czar’ of US health care, to Covid-19 being caused by the installation of the 5G cellphone network (‘Coronavirus spawns conspiracy theories’, (David Knowles), Yahoo!news, 18-Apr-2020, www.yahoonews.com)